Opções de negociação 911

Opções de negociação 11/09
Houve uma negociação muito alta em "put options" na American Airline e na United Airlines, imediatamente antes do 11 de setembro. Estes foram efetivamente jogos que os preços de suas ações caíram, o que, claro, é o que aconteceu uma vez que os ataques ocorreram. Isso mostra que os comerciantes devem ter tido conhecimento prévio do 11 de setembro.
Esta é uma história complexa, mas as reivindicações nem sempre combinam a realidade.
"Um investidor institucional único com base nos EUA sem vínculos concebíveis com a Al Qaeda comprou 95 por cento da UAL coloca em 6 de setembro como parte de uma estratégia de negociação que também incluiu a compra de 115.000 ações da americana em 10 de setembro.
Talvez o desafio mais forte para esta conclusão venha do Professor Allen M Poteshman da Universidade de Illinois em Urbana-Champaign. Ele decidiu investigar isso ainda mais, analisando dados de mercado estatisticamente para tentar avaliar os negócios # 8217; significado. O professor Poteshman aponta vários motivos para questionar o argumento de conhecimento prévio:
Apesar das opiniões expressadas pelos meios de comunicação populares, profissionais acadêmicos e profissionais do mercado de opções, há razões para questionar a determinação da evidência que os terroristas negociaram no mercado de opções antes dos ataques de 11 de setembro. Um evento que causa dúvidas sobre a evidência é o acidente de um avião da American Airlines em Nova York em 12 de novembro. De acordo com o site da OCC, três dias de negociação antes, em 7 de novembro, o índice de colocação de opções sobre ações AMR era 7.74. Com base nas declarações feitas sobre os vínculos entre a atividade de mercado de opção e o terrorismo pouco depois de 11 de setembro, teria sido tentador inferir a partir deste índice de colocação que o terrorismo provavelmente foi a causa do acidente de 12 de novembro. Posteriormente, no entanto, o terrorismo foi excluído. Embora possa ser o caso de uma proporção anormalmente grande de RLM de AMR ter sido observada por acaso no dia 7 de novembro, este evento certamente levanta a questão de saber se os rácios de apontar-se tão grandes como 7,74 são, na verdade, incomuns. Além do acidente de avião do 12 de novembro, um artigo publicado no Barron & # 8217; s em 8 de outubro (Arvedlund 2001) oferece várias razões adicionais para ser cético sobre as afirmações de que é provável que terroristas ou seus associados troquem as opções AMR e UAL antes do Ataques de 11 de setembro. Para iniciantes, o artigo observa que a negociação mais pesada das opções de AMR não ocorreu nas posições mais baratas, mais curtas, o que teria proporcionado os maiores lucros para alguém que conhecesse os próximos ataques. Além disso, um analista emitiu um & # 8220; vender & # 8221; recomendação sobre a AMR durante a semana anterior, o que pode ter levado os investidores a comprar AMR. Da mesma forma, o preço das ações da UAL recentemente declinou o suficiente para se referir a comerciantes técnicos que podem ter aumentado suas compras em compra, e as opções UAL são fortemente negociadas por instituições que cobrem suas posições de ações. Finalmente, os comerciantes que fazem mercados nas opções não aumentaram o preço de venda no momento em que as ordens chegaram, como se houvesse se acreditassem que as ordens eram baseadas em informações adversas não públicas: os fabricantes de mercado não pareciam achar que a negociação estava fora do ordinário no momento em que ocorreu.
No entanto, ele desenvolve um modelo estatístico, o que ele sugere é consistente com a presciência depois de tudo:
Os comerciantes de opções, os gerentes corporativos, os analistas de segurança, os funcionários do intercâmbio, os reguladores, os promotores, os formuladores de políticas e os usuários do público em geral têm interesse em saber se a negociação de opções incomuns ocorreu em torno de determinados eventos. Um dos principais exemplos desse evento são os ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro, e houve uma grande especulação sobre se a atividade de mercado de opções indicava que os terroristas ou seus associados trocaram nos dias que antecederam o 11 de setembro sobre o conhecimento prévio do ataques iminentes. Esta especulação, no entanto, ocorreu na ausência de uma compreensão das características relevantes da negociação do mercado de opções.
Uma questão que nos preocupa sobre isso é a falta de análise da série de más notícias entregues pela American Airlines no dia 7 de setembro, o dia de negociação antes do dia 10 de setembro, quando a negociação mais significativa ocorreu. Professor Poteshman nos disse por e-mail:
Meu estudo inclui regressões quantile que respondem pelas condições do mercado em ações específicas. Portanto, há pelo menos uma correção de primeira ordem para a notícia negativa que estava sendo lançada em 7 de setembro na AMR.
Mas você pode realmente tratar a notícia tão simplesmente? O professor Paul Zarembka apoia as afirmações, dizendo:
Poteshman encontra. essas compras [de opções no estoque da companhia aérea americana]. tinha apenas 1% de probabilidade de ocorrer de forma aleatória.
Mas nós não estamos dizendo que eram aleatórios, e sim que eles podem ter sido uma resposta racional a más notícias significativas entregues no dia anterior. Poteshman está dizendo essencialmente (no que diz respeito à AMR) que as pessoas compraram demais para que isso seja explicado pelas notícias 9/7, portanto, é necessária outra explicação, mas como você pode dizer isso sem analisar a própria notícia? Afinal, se essa notícia estivesse faltando provavelmente em seis meses e # 8201; então, os índices de colocação provavelmente teriam sido ainda mais significativos, e o modelo de Poteshman apresentou ainda mais confirmação da "atividade de mercado da opção inusitada # # 8221", mas isso teria tornado a idéia da presciência mais provável? Nós não pensamos assim. Obviamente, as notícias da AMR eram menos significativas, mas ainda dizemos que você não pode julgar com precisão o significado desses negócios até que você tome em consideração.
Um único investidor institucional com base nos EUA sem vínculos concebíveis com a Al Qaeda comprou 95 por cento da UAL coloca em 6 de setembro como parte de uma estratégia de negociação que também incluiu a compra de 115 mil ações da americana em 10 de setembro. Da mesma forma, grande parte da negociação aparentemente suspeita Na América, em 10 de setembro, foi rastreada para um boletim informativo específico de negociação de opções nos Estados Unidos, enviada por fax para seus assinantes no domingo 9 de setembro, o que recomendou esses negócios.
O 6 de setembro, o UAL coloca automaticamente parece significativo, então, mesmo que apenas um investidor esteja supostamente atrás deles. Mas isso realmente significa que você pode indicar matematicamente que o investidor tinha conhecimento prévio do 11 de setembro, sem considerar as outras condições do mercado e as informações disponíveis no momento?

Opções de negociação 11/09
Detalhes suprimidos de Leading de Insider Trading Criminal diretamente nos Rank mais altos da CIA & # 146; s.
FTW - 9 de outubro de 2001 e # 150; Apesar de serem uniformemente ignorados pela mídia norte-americana, há evidências abundantes e claras de que uma série de transações nos mercados financeiros indicou a presciência específica (criminal) dos ataques de 11 de setembro no World Trade Center e no Pentágono. No caso de pelo menos uma dessas negociações - que deixou um prêmio de US $ 2,5 milhões não reclamado - a empresa costumava colocar as opções de & # 147; put # 148; no estoque da United Airlines foi, até 1998, administrado pelo homem que agora ocupa o cargo de Diretor Executivo número três na Agência Central de Inteligência.
Até 1997 A. B. & # 147; Buzzy & # 148; Krongard tinha sido presidente do banco de investimento A. B. Castanho. A. B. Brown foi adquirido pelo Banker & # 146; s Trust em 1997. Krongard tornou-se, como parte da fusão, o vice-presidente do Banker & # 146; s Trust-AB Brown, um dos 20 principais bancos dos EUA nomeados pelo senador Carl Levin este ano como estar ligado ao branqueamento de capitais. A última posição da Krongard na Banker & # 146; s Trust (BT) era supervisionar & # 147; relações com clientes privados. & # 148; Nesta capacidade, ele teve relações práticas diretas com algumas das pessoas mais ricas do mundo em uma espécie de operação bancária especializada que foi identificada pelo Senado dos EUA e outros pesquisadores como intimamente ligados ao lavagem de dinheiro da droga.
O ÂMBITO DA NEGOCIAÇÃO CONHECIDA CONHECIDA.
Antes de investigar mais nessas relações, é necessário examinar as informações de informações privilegiadas que estão sendo ignoradas pela Reuters, The New York Times e outras mídias de massa. Está bem documentado que a CIA há muito acompanhou esses negócios & # 150; em tempo real & # 150; como possíveis advertências de ataques terroristas e outros movimentos econômicos contrários aos interesses dos EUA. As histórias anteriores da FTW destacaram especificamente o uso do software Promis para monitorar esses negócios.
É necessário compreender apenas dois termos financeiros fundamentais para entender o significado dessas negociações, & # 147; vender short & # 148; e & # 147; put options & # 148 ;.
& # 147; Selling Short & # 148; é o empréstimo de ações, vendendo-o aos preços atuais do mercado, mas não sendo necessário que realmente produza o estoque por algum tempo. Se o estoque cai precipitadamente após a entrada do contrato curto, o vendedor pode então cumprir o contrato comprando o estoque após o preço cair e concluir o contrato no preço pré-colisão. Estes contratos geralmente têm uma janela de até quatro meses.
& # 147; Opções de colocação, & # 148; são contratos que dão ao comprador a opção de vender ações em uma data posterior. Comprados a preços nominais de, por exemplo, US $ 1,00 por ação, são vendidos em blocos de 100 ações. Se forem exercidos, dão ao titular a opção de vender ações selecionadas em uma data futura a um preço fixado quando o contrato é emitido. Assim, por um investimento de US $ 10.000, pode ser possível amarrar 10.000 ações da United or American Airlines a US $ 100 por ação, e o vendedor da opção é então obrigado a comprá-las se a opção for executada. Se o estoque caiu para US $ 50 quando o contrato tiver vencimento, o titular da opção pode comprar as ações por US $ 50 e imediatamente vendê-las por US $ 100 e 150; independentemente de onde o mercado se encontra. Uma opção de compra é o reverso de uma opção de venda, que é, de fato, uma aposta de derivativos que o preço da ação aumentará.
Uma história de 21 de setembro do Instituto de Políticas Internacionais israelenses Herzliyya para o Contra-terrorismo, intitulado "Black Tuesday: The World's Greatest Insider Trading Scam"? # 148; documentou os seguintes negócios ligados aos ataques de 11 de setembro:
- Entre 6 e 7 de setembro, o Chicago Board Options Exchange viu compras de 4.744 opções de venda na United Airlines, mas apenas 396 opções de compra e # 133; Supondo que 4.000 das opções foram compradas por pessoas com conhecimento prévio dos ataques iminentes, estes & # 147; insiders & # 148; teria lucrado quase US $ 5 milhões.
- Em 10 de setembro, 4.516 opções de venda da American Airlines foram compradas na bolsa de Chicago, em comparação com apenas 748 chamadas. Novamente, não havia notícias nesse momento para justificar esse desequilíbrio; Novamente, assumindo que 4.000 dessas negociações de opções representam & # 147; insiders, & # 148; eles representariam um ganho de cerca de US $ 4 milhões.
- [Os níveis de opções de compra comprados acima foram mais de seis vezes maiores do que o normal.]
- Nenhuma negociação semelhante em outras companhias aéreas ocorreu na bolsa de Chicago nos dias imediatamente anteriores a terça-feira negra.
- Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & amp; Co., que ocupou 22 andares do World Trade Center, viu 2,157 de outubro as opções de venda de US $ 45 compradas nos três dias de negociação antes da terça-feira negra; Isso se compara a uma média de 27 contratos por dia antes de 6 de setembro. O preço da ação da Morgan Stanley caiu de US $ 48.90 para US $ 42,50 no pós-ataque. Supondo que 2 mil desses contratos de opções foram comprados com base no conhecimento dos ataques que se aproximavam, seus compradores poderiam ter lucrado em pelo menos US $ 1,2 milhão. Merrill Lynch & amp; Co., com sede perto das Torres Gêmeas, viu 12,215 de outubro as opções de US $ 45 compradas nos quatro dias de negociação antes dos ataques; O volume médio anterior dessas ações tinha sido de 252 contratos por dia [um aumento de 1200%!]. Quando a negociação foi retomada, as ações da Merrill caiu de US $ 46,88 para US $ 41,50; assumindo que 11.000 contratos de opção foram comprados pelo & # 147; insiders, & # 148; Seu lucro teria sido cerca de US $ 5,5 milhões.
- Os reguladores europeus estão examinando os negócios na Alemanha Re re Swiss Re, Swiss Re e AXA da França, todos os principais resseguradores com exposição ao desastre da terça-feira negra. [Nota de FTW: AXA também possui mais de 25% das ações da American Airlines, fazendo com que os ataques sejam "double whammy & # 148; para eles.]
Em 29 de setembro de 2001 e # 150; em uma história vital que passou despercebida pela mídia principal & # 150; informou o San Francisco Chronicle, "Os investidores ainda não coletaram mais de US $ 2,5 milhões em lucros que fizeram opções de negociação no estoque da United Airlines antes dos atentados terroristas de 11 de setembro, de acordo com uma fonte familiarizada com os negócios e o mercado dados.
& # 147; O dinheiro não recolhido suscita suspeitas de que os investidores & # 150; cujas identidades e nacionalidades não foram tornadas públicas & # 150; teve conhecimento prévio das greves. & # 148; Eles não se mostraram agora. A suspensão da negociação durante quatro dias após os ataques impossibilitou a retirada rápida e reivindicou o prêmio antes que os pesquisadores começassem a procurar.
& # 147; & # 133; As opções da série de outubro para a UAL Corp. foram compradas em volumes altamente incomuns três dias de negociação antes dos ataques terroristas para um total de $ 2.070; os investidores compraram os contratos de opção, cada um representando 100 ações, por 90 centavos cada. [Isso representa 230.000 ações]. Essas opções agora estão sendo vendidas em mais de US $ 12 cada. Ainda há 2.313 denominados & # 147; put & # 148; opções em circulação [avaliadas em US $ 2,77 milhões e representativas de 231.300 ações] de acordo com a Options Clearinghouse Corp. & # 148;
& # 147; & # 133; A fonte familiar com os negócios Unidos identificou Deutsche Bank Alex. Brown, o braço norte-americano de bancos de investimento do Deutsche Bank alemão, como o banco de investimento costumava comprar pelo menos algumas dessas opções & # 133; Esta foi a operação gerida por Krongard até 1998.
Conforme relatado em outras notícias, o Deutsche Bank também foi o centro da atividade de informação privilegiada ligada a Munique Re. pouco antes dos ataques.
CIA, OS BANCOS E OS CORRETORES.
Compreender as inter-relações entre a CIA eo mundo bancário e corretor é fundamental para entender as implicações já assustadoras das revelações acima. Vejamos a história da CIA, Wall Street e os grandes bancos, observando alguns dos principais atores da história da CIA.
Clark Clifford & # 150; O Ato de Segurança Nacional de 1947 foi escrito por Clark Clifford, um poderío do Partido Democrata, ex-Secretário de Defesa e único conselheiro do presidente Harry Truman. Na década de 1980, como presidente da First American Bancshares, Clifford foi fundamental para obter o banco corrupto da CIA BCCI uma licença para operar nas costas americanas. Sua profissão: advogada e banqueira de Wall Street.
John Foster e Allen Dulles & # 150; Estes dois irmãos & # 147; projetou & # 148; A CIA para Clifford. Ambos foram ativos em operações de inteligência durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Allen Dulles foi o embaixador dos EUA na Suíça, onde se encontrou freqüentemente com líderes nazistas e cuidou dos investimentos dos EUA na Alemanha. John Foster passou a se tornar Secretário de Estado sob Dwight Eisenhower e Allen passou a servir como diretor da CIA sob Eisenhower e mais tarde foi demitido pela JFK. Suas profissões: parceiros dos mais poderosos - até hoje - escritório de advocacia de Wall Street, Sullivan, Cromwell.
Bill Casey & # 150; O diretor da CIA de Ronald Reagan e veterano do OSS que atuou como negociador principal durante os anos Irã-Contra foi, sob o presidente Richard Nixon, presidente da Securities and Exchange Commission. Sua profissão: advogada e corretor de bolsa de Wall Street.
David Doherty - O atual vice-presidente da Bolsa de Nova York para a execução é o conselheiro geral aposentado da Agência Central de Inteligência.
George Herbert Walker Bush & # 150; Presidente de 1989 a janeiro de 1993, também atuou como Diretor da CIA por 13 meses a partir de 1976-7. Ele é agora um consultor remunerado do Grupo Carlyle, o 11º maior contratado de defesa do país, que também compartilha investimentos conjuntos com a família Bin Laden.
A. B. & # 147; Buzzy & # 148; Krongard & # 150; O atual Diretor Executivo da Agência Central de Inteligência é o ex-presidente do banco de investimentos A. B. Brown e ex-vice-presidente do Banker & # 146; s Trust.
John Deutch - Este diretor aposentado da CIA da administração Clinton atualmente fica no conselho do Citigroup, o segundo maior banco da nação, que tem sido repetidamente e abertamente envolvido no lavagem documentado de dinheiro da droga. Isso inclui a compra no Citigroup & # 146; s 2001 de um banco mexicano conhecido pela lavagem de dinheiro da droga, Banamex.
Nora Slatkin & # 150; Este diretor executivo aposentado da CIA também fica no conselho do Citibank.
Maurice & # 147; Hank & # 148; Greenburg & # 150; O CEO do seguro AIG, gerente do terceiro maior grupo de investimentos de capital do mundo, foi lançado como um possível diretor da CIA em 1995. A FTW expôs a conexão de Greenberg e AIG com o tráfico de drogas da CIA e operações secretas em uma série de duas partes que foi interrompida apenas antes dos ataques de 11 de setembro. O estoque da AIG foi recuperado notavelmente bem desde os ataques. Para ler essa história, vá para copvcia / stories / part_2.html.
Pergunta-se a quanta evidência condenatória é necessária para responder ao que agora é uma prova irrefutável de que a CIA sabia sobre os ataques e não os impediu. Seja lá o que o nosso governo está fazendo, seja lá o que a CIA esteja fazendo, claramente não é do interesse do povo americano, especialmente aqueles que morreram em 11 de setembro.
[© COPYRIGHT, 2001, Michael C. Ruppert e FTW Publications, copvcia. Todos os direitos reservados. & # 150; Pode ser reimpresso ou distribuído apenas para fins sem fins lucrativos.]
Comandante em Chefe.
Back Off Bin Ladens.
The Bushes e o Grupo Carlyle.
Como Bush e outros ex-politicos se beneficiam de conexões e acesso.
O que ele não quer que os americanos conheçam?
As sanções têm lacunas de que nosso vice-presidente fez milhões.

Como 11 de setembro afetou a bolsa de valores dos EUA.
Para evitar uma crise do mercado de ações, a Bolsa de Valores de Nova York (NYSE) e a Nasdaq não abriram para negociação na manhã de terça-feira, 11 de setembro de 2001. Quando o vôo 11 da American Airlines entrou na torre norte do World Trade Center às 8: 46 horas e o voo 175 da American Airlines atingiu a Torre do Sul às 9h03, era óbvio que o americano estava sob ataque. (Para mais, leia os efeitos do Terrorismo em Wall Street.)
O pressuposto de que um assalto terrorista coordenado por radicais islâmicos visou algumas das estruturas e instituições mais emblemáticas do país foi confirmado em algum momento da manhã em que um avião atingiu o Pentágono e um quarto avião seqüestrado para Washington, DC, foi derrubado pelos passageiros em Shanksville, PA.
Reação do mercado.
Antecipando o caos do mercado, a venda de pânico e uma perda desastrosa de valor na sequência dos ataques, a NYSE e a Nasdaq permaneceram fechadas até 17 de setembro, o desligamento mais longo desde 1933. Além disso, muitas empresas de comércio, corretagem e outras empresas financeiras possuíam escritórios em o World Trade Center e não conseguiram funcionar na sequência da trágica perda de vidas e do colapso de ambas as torres.
No primeiro dia de negociação da NYSE após o 11 de setembro, o mercado caiu 684 pontos, um declínio de 7,1%, estabelecendo um recorde para a maior perda de histórico de trocas por um dia de negociação. No final da negociação na sexta-feira, que terminou uma semana que viu as maiores perdas na história da NYSE, o Dow Jones baixou quase 1.370 pontos, representando uma perda de mais de 14%. O índice Standard and Poor's (S & amp; P) perdeu 11,6%. Um valor estimado de US $ 1,4 trilhão foi perdido nos cinco dias de negociação.
As principais vendas de ações atingiram os setores de companhias aéreas e de seguros conforme previsto quando as negociações foram retomadas. Os mais atingidos foram American Airlines e United Airlines, transportadoras cujos aviões foram seqüestrados pelos ataques terroristas.
The Financial Aftermath.
O estoque da American Airlines, Inc. (NYSE: AMR) caiu de um fechamento de $ 29.70 por ação de 11 de setembro para US $ 18,00 por ação fechada em 17 de setembro, uma queda de 39%. As ações da United Airlines, Inc. (NYSE: UAL) caíram de US $ 30,82 por ação perto de US $ 17,50 por ação no fechamento em 17 de setembro, uma queda de 42%.
Decisões íngremes semelhantes atingiram os setores de viagens, turismo, hospitalidade, entretenimento e serviços financeiros, como uma onda de medo temporário e incerteza varreu a nação. Entre os gigantes dos serviços financeiros com as maiores taxas de preços das ações - Merrill Lynch perdeu 11,5%, e Morgan Stanley perdeu 13%.
As empresas de seguros, eventualmente, pagaram cerca de US $ 40,2 bilhões em reclamações relacionadas ao 11 de setembro. Entre os maiores perdedores foi o Berkshire Hathaway de Warren Buffet. A maioria das empresas de seguros abandonou a cobertura terrorista.
Investir na proteção.
Alguns setores, no entanto, prosperaram como resultado dos ataques. Certas empresas de tecnologia, bem como empreiteiros de defesa e armamento, viram os preços para suas ações aumentar substancialmente, antecipando um impulso no negócio do governo como o país preparado para a longa guerra contra o terrorismo. Os preços das ações também aumentaram para as empresas de comunicações e farmacêuticas.
Nas trocas de opções do país, incluindo o Chicago Board Options Exchange (o maior do mundo), o volume de chamadas e chamadas aumentou de forma correspondente. As opções de compra, que permitem que um investidor se beneficie se uma ação específica declinar no preço, foram compradas em grande número nas ações aéreas, bancárias e de seguros. As opções de compra, que permitem que um investidor aproveite as ações que subam preço, foram adquiridas em empresas de defesa e militares. No curto prazo, os investidores que compraram essas opções ganharam dinheiro.

Pesquisa Global.
Trocas incomuns de opções de estoque antes do 11 de setembro: documentos destruídos pelo governo referentes às opções de compra pré-9/11.
Em 19 de setembro de 2001, a CBS relatou:
Fontes dizem à CBS News que, na tarde anterior ao ataque, os sinos de alarme estavam tocando nas negociações incomuns no mercado de opções de ações nos Estados Unidos.
Um número extraordinário de negócios estavam apostando que o preço das ações da American Airlines caísse.
Os negócios são chamados & # 8220; puts & # 8221; e eles envolveram pelo menos 450 mil ações americanas. Mas o que levantou a bandeira vermelha é que mais de 80 por cento das ordens foram & # 8220; coloca & # 8221 ;, superando em número & # 8220; chamada & # 8221; opções, as apostas do estoque aumentariam.
Fontes dizem que nunca viram esse tipo de desequilíbrio antes, relata CBS News Correspondente Sharyl Attkisson. Normalmente, os números são bastante pares.
Após os ataques terroristas, o preço das ações da American Airline caiu obviamente em 39%, e de acordo com fontes, isso se traduziu em bem mais de $ 5 milhões de lucro total para a pessoa ou pessoas que apostaram que o estoque caísse.
Pelo menos uma empresa de Wall Street relatou suas suspeitas sobre essa atividade na SEC logo após o ataque.
O mesmo aconteceu com a United Airlines no Chicago Board Options Exchange quatro dias antes do ataque. Um número extremamente desequilibrado de negociações que apostaram no preço das ações da United caísse - também se transformou em grandes lucros quando ocorreu após os seqüestros.
& # 8220; Nós podemos trabalhar diretamente para trás de uma troca no chão do Chicago Board Options Exchange. O comerciante está vinculado a uma corretora. A corretora recebeu a ordem de comprar aquele & # 8216; put & # 8217; opção de alguém dentro de uma empresa de corretagem especulando, ou de um dos clientes, & # 8221; disse Randall Dodd, do Instituto de Estratégia Econômica.
Os investigadores dos EUA querem saber se Osama bin Laden foi o comerciante interno # 82201 # 8221; - lucrando com uma tragédia que ele suspeitou de planejar para financiar sua operação. As autoridades também estão investigando operações possivelmente suspeitas na Alemanha, Suíça, Itália e Japão.
Em 29 de setembro de 2001, o San Francisco Chronicle apontou:
& # 8220; Geralmente, se alguém tiver uma ganância como esse, você tira o dinheiro e corre, & # 8221; disse a fonte, que falou sob condição de anonimato. & # 8220; Quem fez isso pensou que a troca não seria fechada por quatro dias.
Houve um salto excepcionalmente grande nas compras de opções de venda nas ações da UAL Corp. e da AMR Corp. nos três dias úteis antes do ataque às principais trocas de opções nos Estados Unidos. Em um dia, as compras de opções de venda da UAL foram 25 vezes maiores do que a média do ano até a data. No mês anterior aos ataques, as vendas baixas subiram 40 por cento para a UAL e 20 por cento para os americanos.
Porta-vozes para reguladores de valores mobiliários britânicos e o grupo AXA também confirmaram ontem que as investigações continuam.
A fonte familiar com os negócios Unidos identificou Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown, o braço de banca de investimento americano do Deutsche Bank alemão, como o banco de investimento costumava comprar pelo menos algumas das opções.
No fim de semana passado, o presidente do banco central alemão, Ernst Welteke, disse que um estudo apontou para o "intercâmbio de informações de terrorismo" # 8221; nesses estoques.
Em 19 de outubro de 2001, a Crônica escreveu:
Em 2 de outubro, os funcionários canadenses de valores mobiliários confirmaram que a SEC havia pedido privações às empresas de investimentos norte-americanas para que revisassem seus registros por provas de atividade comercial nas ações de 38 empresas, sugerindo que alguns compradores e vendedores poderiam ter conhecimento prévio dos ataques.
A porta-voz da FMR Corp., Anne Crowley, disse que a firma # 8212; que é dono da gigantesca família de fundos mútuos da Fidelity em Boston & # 8212; já forneceu & # 8220; conta e transação & # 8221; informações aos investigadores, e não teve nenhuma objeção aos novos procedimentos anunciados ontem. Crowley recusou-se a descrever a natureza das informações anteriormente compartilhadas com o governo.
Então, o esforço para rastrear a origem das put foi certamente bastante substancial.
Quais foram os resultados da investigação?
Aparentemente, nunca mais saberemos.
Especificamente, David Callahan & # 8211; editor executivo da SmartCEO & # 8211; apresentou um pedido da Lei de Liberdade de Informação à SEC sobre as opções de venda pré-9/11.
Fomos informados de que os registros potencialmente responsivos foram destruídos.
Se a SEC tivesse respondido produzindo documentos que mostravam que as opções de pré-9/11 tinham uma explicação inocente (como um hedge feito por uma companhia aérea menor), isso seria possível.
Se a SEC tivesse respondido dizendo que os documentos eram classificados de alguma forma protegendo informações financeiras proprietárias, eu não gostaria, mas eu entendi pelo menos o argumento.
Mas destruído? Por quê?
Não é a primeira vez.
Esta não é a primeira destruição de provas documentais relacionadas ao 11 de setembro.
Como indiquei em 2007:
O relatório da Comissão do 11 de setembro baseou-se em grande parte em um relato em terceira parte do que os detidos torturados disseram, sendo que duas das três partes na comunicação eram funcionários do governo.
O relatório oficial da Comissão do 11 de Setembro afirma:
Os capítulos 5 e 7 dependem fortemente das informações obtidas dos membros capturados da Al Qaeda. Um número desses "detentos" # 8221; tem conhecimento de primeira mão da trama do 11 de setembro. Avaliar a verdade das declarações dessas testemunhas - inimigos jurados dos Estados Unidos - é um desafio. Nosso acesso a eles foi limitado à revisão de relatórios de inteligência com base em comunicações recebidas dos locais onde os interrogatórios efetivos ocorrem. Enviamos perguntas para uso nos interrogatórios, mas não controlamos se, quando, ou como perguntas de particular interesse seriam feitas. Nem fomos autorizados a conversar com os interrogadores para que possamos melhor avaliar a credibilidade dos detidos e esclarecer ambiguidades nos relatórios.
Em outras palavras, os Comissários do 11 de setembro não podiam falar com os detidos, nem mesmo com seus interrogadores. Em vez disso, eles obtiveram suas informações em terceiro lugar.
A Comissão não confiou realmente no testemunho do interrogatório. Por exemplo, um dos principais arquitetos do Relatório da Comissão do 11 de setembro, Ernest May, disse em maio de 2005:
Nunca tivemos plena confiança nos relatórios de interrogação como fontes históricas.
A Newsweek está dirigindo um ensaio do [repórter investigativo do New York Times], Philip Shenon, dizendo [que o relatório da Comissão do 11 de setembro não era confiável porque a maioria das informações estava baseada nas declarações de presos torturados]:
A comissão parece ter ignorado indícios óbvios ao longo de 2003 e 2004 que sua conta do argumento do 11 de setembro e da história da Al Qaeda dependia fortemente da informação obtida de detidos que haviam sido submetidos a tortura ou algo não muito distante disso.
O painel não levantou nenhum protesto público sobre os métodos de interrogatório da CIA, apesar de notícias no momento sugerirem quão brutais eram esses métodos. Na verdade, a comissão exigiu que a CIA realize novas rodadas de interrogatórios em 2004 para obter respostas a suas perguntas.
Isso tem implicações preocupantes para a credibilidade do relatório final da comissão. Nos círculos da inteligência, o testemunho obtido através da tortura é tipicamente desacreditado; A pesquisa mostra que as pessoas dirão qualquer coisa sob ameaça de intensa dor física.
E, no entanto, é uma possibilidade distinta de que a Al Qaeda suspeite que foi a fonte exclusiva de informações para longas passagens do relatório da comissão pode ter sido submetida a "# 8221; técnicas de interrogatório, ou, pelo menos, ameaçadas com eles, por causa da Comissão do 11 de setembro.
A informação dos interrogatórios da CIA sobre dois dos três KSM e Abu Zubaydah é citado em dois capítulos-chave do relatório do painel, com foco no planejamento e execução dos ataques e na história da Al Qaeda.
Notas de rodapé no relatório do painel indicam quando foram obtidas informações de detidos interrogados pela CIA. Uma análise realizada pela NBC News descobriu que mais de uma quarta das notas do relatório - 441 de cerca de 1.700 - referiram-se a detidos que foram submetidos à CIA & # 8217; s & # 8220; reforçada & # 8221; programa de interrogatório, incluindo o trio que foi educado.
Os membros da Comissão observam que pressionaram repetidamente a Casa Branca e a CIA para o acesso direto aos detidos, mas a administração recusou. Assim, a comissão enviou perguntas à CIA, cujos interrogadores as colocaram no nome do painel.
O relatório da comissão não deu nenhuma dica de que os métodos de interrogação severos foram usados ​​na coleta de informações, afirmando que o painel tinha "# controle" # 8221; sobre a forma como a CIA fez o seu trabalho; Os autores também disseram que tentaram corroborar a informação # 8220; com documentos e declarações de outros. & # 8221;
Mas como poderia a comissão corroborar informações conhecidas apenas por um punhado de pessoas em uma rede terrorista sombria, a maioria dos quais estava morto ou ainda em liberdade?
O ex-senador Bob Kerrey, da Nebraska, um democrata na comissão, disse-me que, no ano passado, temia que a investigação dependesse muito das contas de detidos da Al Qaeda que fossem coagidos fisicamente por falarem.
Kerrey disse que pode demorar uma comissão permanente do 9/11 e # 8221; para acabar com os mistérios restantes de 11 de setembro.
Abu Zubaida era bem conhecido do FBI como sendo literalmente louco. As citações do Washington Post e os funcionários do FBI, incluindo agentes que questionaram [alegado Abu Zubaida, membro da Al-Qaeda] após a sua captura ou revisaram os documentos apreendidos em sua casa # 8221; como concluindo que ele era:
[L] argely um hotelero alto e mentalmente perturbado cuja credibilidade caiu quando a CIA o submeteu a uma técnica simulada de afogamento conhecida como waterboarding e a outros interrogatórios aprimorados e # 8221; medidas.
Retired FBI agent Daniel Coleman, who led an examination of documents after Abu Zubaida’s capture in early 2002 and worked on the case, said the CIA’s harsh tactics cast doubt on the credibility of Abu Zubaida’s information.
“I don’t have confidence in anything he says, because once you go down that road, everything you say is tainted,” Coleman said, referring to the harsh measures. “He was talking before they did that to him, but they didn’t believe him. The problem is they didn’t realize he didn’t know all that much.”
“They said, ‘You’ve got to be kidding me,’ & # 8221; said Coleman, recalling accounts from FBI employees who were there. & # 8221; ‘This guy’s a Muslim. That’s not going to win his confidence. Are you trying to get information out of him or just belittle him?'” Coleman helped lead the bureau’s efforts against Osama bin Laden for a decade, ending in 2004.
Coleman goes on to say:
Abu Zubaida … was a “safehouse keeper” with mental problems who claimed to know more about al-Qaeda and its inner workings than he really did.
Looking at other evidence, including a serious head injury that Abu Zubaida had suffered years earlier, Coleman and others at the FBI believed that he had severe mental problems that called his credibility into question. “They all knew he was crazy, and they knew he was always on the damn phone,” Coleman said, referring to al-Qaeda operatives. “You think they’re going to tell him anything?”
Senior Bush administration officials sternly cautioned the 9/11 Commission against probing too deeply into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, according to a document recently obtained by the ACLU.
The notification came in a letter dated January 6, 2004, addressed by Attorney General John Ashcroft, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and CIA Director George J. Tenet. The ACLU described it as a fax sent by David Addington, then-counsel to former vice president Dick Cheney.
In the message, the officials denied the bipartisan commission’s request to question terrorist detainees, informing its two senior-most members that doing so would “cross” a “line” and obstruct the administration’s ability to protect the nation.
“In response to the Commission’s expansive requests for access to secrets, the executive branch has provided such access in full cooperation,” the letter read. “There is, however, a line that the Commission should not cross — the line separating the Commission’s proper inquiry into the September 11, 2001 attacks from interference with the Government’s ability to safeguard the national security, including protection of Americans from future terrorist attacks.”
“The Commission staff’s proposed participation in questioning of detainees would cross that line,” the letter continued. “As the officers of the United States responsible for the law enforcement, defense and intelligence functions of the Government, we urge your Commission not to further pursue the proposed request to participate in the questioning of detainees.”
Destruction of Evidence.
The interrogators made videotapes of the interrogations. The 9/11 Commission asked for all tapes, but the CIA lied and said there weren’t any.
The CIA then destroyed the tapes.
Specifically, the New York Times confirms that the government swore that it had turned over all of the relevant material regarding the statements of the people being interrogated:
“The commission did formally request material of this kind from all relevant agencies, and the commission was assured that we had received all the material responsive to our request,” said Philip D. Zelikow, who served as executive director of the Sept. 11 commission ….
“No tapes were acknowledged or turned over, nor was the commission provided with any transcript prepared from recordings,” he said.
But is the destruction of the tapes — and hiding from the 9/11 Commission the fact that the tapes existed — a big deal? Yes, actually. As the Times goes on to state:
Daniel Marcus, a law professor at American University who served as general counsel for the Sept. 11 commission and was involved in the discussions about interviews with Al Qaeda leaders, said he had heard nothing about any tapes being destroyed.
If tapes were destroyed, he said, “it’s a big deal, it’s a very big deal,” because it could amount to obstruction of justice to withhold evidence being sought in criminal or fact-finding investigations.
Indeed, 9/11 Commission co-chairs Thomas Keane and Lee Hamilton wrote:
Those who knew about those videotapes — and did not tell us about them — obstructed our investigation.
The CIA also is refusing to release any transcripts from the interrogation sessions. As I wrote a year ago:
What does the fact that the CIA destroyed numerous videotapes of Guantanamo interrogations, but has 3,000 pages of transcripts from those tapes really mean?
Initially, it means that CIA’s claim that it destroyed the video tapes to protect the interrogators’ identity is false. Por quê? Well, the transcripts contain the identity of the interrogator. And the CIA is refusing to produce the transcripts.
Obviously, the CIA could have “blurred” the face of the interrogator and shifted his voice (like you’ve seen on investigative tv shows like 60 Minutes) to protect the interrogator’s identity. And since the CIA is not releasing the transcripts, it similarly could have refused to release the videos.
O fato de que a CIA, em vez disso, destruiu os vídeos mostra que ele tem algo a esconder.
Trying to Create a False Linkage?
I have repeatedly pointed out that the top interrogation experts say that torture doesn’t work.
Many people are starting to understand that top Bush administration officials not only knowingly lied about a non-existent connection between Al Qaida and Iraq, but they pushed and insisted that interrogators use special torture methods aimed at extracting false confessions to attempt to create such a false linkage.
And as Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times:
Let’s say this slowly: the Bush administration wanted to use 9/11 as a pretext to invade Iraq, even though Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11. So it tortured people to make them confess to the nonexistent link.
Much of the 9/11 Commission Report was based upon the testimony of people who were tortured At least four of the people whose interrogation figured in the 9/11 Commission Report have claimed that they told interrogators information as a way to stop being “tortured.” One of the Commission’s main sources of information was tortured until he agreed to sign a confession that he was NOT EVEN ALLOWED TO READ The 9/11 Commission itself doubted the accuracy of the torture confessions, and yet kept their doubts to themselves.
Remember, as discussed above, the torture techniques used by the Bush administration to try to link Iraq and 9/11 were specifically geared towards creating false confessions (they were techniques created by the communists to be used in show trials).
The above-linked NBC news report quotes a couple of legal experts to this effect:
Michael Ratner, president of the Center for Constitutional Rights, says he is “shocked” that the Commission never asked about extreme interrogation measures.
“If you’re sitting at the 9/11 Commission, with all the high-powered lawyers on the Commission and on the staff, first you ask what happened rather than guess,” said Ratner, whose center represents detainees at Guantanamo. “Most people look at the 9/11 Commission Report as a trusted historical document. If their conclusions were supported by information gained from torture, therefore their conclusions are suspect.”…
Karen Greenberg, director of the Center for Law and Security at New York University’s School of Law, put it this way: “[I]t should have relied on sources not tainted. It calls into question how we were willing to use these interrogations to construct the narrative.”
The interrogations were “used” to “construct the narrative” which the 9/11 Commission decided to use.
Remember (as explored in the book The Commission by respected journalist Philip Shenon), that the Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission was an administration insider whose area of expertise is the creation and maintenance of “public myths” thought to be true, even if not actually true. He wrote an outline of what he wanted the report to say very early in the process, controlled what the Commission did and did not analyze, then limited the scope of the Commission’s inquiry so that the overwhelming majority of questions about 9/11 remained unasked (see this article and this article).
As constitutional law expert Jonathan Turley stated:
[The 9/11 Commission] was a commission that was really made for Washington – a commission composed of political appointees of both parties that ran interference for those parties – a commission that insisted at the beginning it would not impose blame on individuals.
Other Obstructions of Justice.
[Other examples of obstructions of justice include the following:]
The chairs of both the 9/11 Commission and the Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees into 9/11 said that government “minders” obstructed the investigation into 9/11 by intimidating witnesses The 9/11 Commissioners concluded that officials from the Pentagon lied to the Commission, and considered recommending criminal charges for such false statements The tape of interviews of air traffic controllers on-duty on 9/11 was intentionally destroyed by crushing the cassette by hand, cutting the tape into little pieces, and then dropping the pieces in different trash cans around the building as shown by this NY Times article (summary version is free; full version is pay-per-view) and by this article from the Chicago Sun-Times Investigators for the Congressional Joint Inquiry discovered that an FBI informant had hosted and even rented a room to two hijackers in 2000 and that, when the Inquiry sought to interview the informant, the FBI refused outright, and then hid him in an unknown location, and that a high-level FBI official stated these blocking maneuvers were undertaken under orders from the White House. As the New York Times notes:
Senator Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat who is a former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, accused the White House on Tuesday of covering up evidence . . .
The accusation stems from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s refusal to allow investigators for a Congressional inquiry and the independent Sept. 11 commission to interview an informant, Abdussattar Shaikh, who had been the landlord in San Diego of two Sept. 11 hijackers.
In his book “Intelligence Matters,” Mr. Graham, the co-chairman of the Congressional inquiry with Representative Porter J. Goss, Republican of Florida, said an F. B.I. official wrote them in November 2002 and said “the administration would not sanction a staff interview with the source.” On Tuesday, Mr. Graham called the letter “a smoking gun” and said, “The reason for this cover-up goes right to the White House.”
We don’t need to even discuss conspiracy theories about what happened on 9/11 to be incredibly disturbed about what happened after: the government’s obstructions of justice.
Indeed, the 9/11 Commissioners themselves are disturbed:
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Global Research.
Insider Trading on 9/11: Speculative Trade in “Put Options”. The Financial Facts Laid Bare.
There can be no dispute that speculative trade in put options – where a party bets that a stock will drop abruptly in value – spiked in the days around September 11, 2001 – even if the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the 9/11 Commission will not say so. More than a few people must have had advance warning of the terror attacks, and they cashed in to the tune of millions of dollars.
Is there any truth in the allegations that informed circles made substantial profits in the financial markets in connection to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States?
Arguably, the best place to start is by examining put options, which occurred around Tuesday, September 11, 2001, to an abnormal extent, and at the beginning via software that played a key role: the Prosecutor’s Management Information System, abbreviated as PROMIS. [i]
PROMIS is a software program that seems to be fitted with almost „magical“ abilities. Furthermore, it is the subject of a decades-long dispute between its inventor, Bill Hamilton, and various people/institutions associated with intelligence agencies, military and security consultancy firms. [1]
One of the „magical“ capabilities of PROMIS, one has to assume, is that it is equipped with artificial intelligence and was apparently from the outset “able to simultaneously read and integrate any number of different computer programs or databases, regardless of the language in which the original programs had been written or the operating systems and platforms on which that database was then currently installed.“ [2]
And then it becomes really interesting:
What would you do if you possessed software that could think, understand every major language in the world, that provided peep-holes into everyone else’s computer „dressing rooms“, that could insert data into computers without people’s knowledge, that could fill in blanks beyond human reasoning, and also predict what people do – before they did it? You would probably use it, wouldn’t you? [3]
Granted, these capabilities sound hardly believable. In fact, the whole story of PROMIS, which Mike Ruppert develops in the course of his book Crossing the Rubicon in all its bizarre facets and turns, seems as if someone had developed a novel in the style of Philip K Dick and William Gibson. However, what Ruppert has collected about PROMIS is based on reputable sources as well as on results of personal investigations, which await a jury to take a first critical look at.
This seems all the more urgent if you add to the PROMIS capabilities „ that it was a given that PROMIS was used for a wide variety of purposes by intelligence agencies, including the real-time monitoring of stock transactions on all the world´s major financial markets“. [4]
We are therefore dealing with a software that.
a) Infiltrates computer and communication systems without being noticed.
b) Can manipulate data.
c) Is capable to track the global stock market trade in real time.
Point c is relevant to all that happened in connection with the never completely cleared up transactions that occurred just before September 11, [5] and of which the former chairman of the Deutsche Bundesbank Ernst Weltke said „could not have been planned and carried out without a certain knowledge“. [6]
I specifically asked financial journalist Max Keiser, who for years had worked on Wall Street as a stock and options trader, about the put option trades. Keiser pointed out in this context that he „had spoken with many brokers in the towers of the World Trade Center around that time. “I heard firsthand about the airline put trade from brokers at Cantor Fitzgerald days before.“ He then talked with me about an explosive issue, on which Ruppert elaborated in detail in Crossing the Rubicon .
Max Keizer: Existem muitos aspectos relativos a essas compras de opções que ainda não foram divulgadas. I also worked at Alex Brown & Sons (ABS). Deutsche Bank bought Alex Brown & Sons in 1999. When the attacks occurred, ABS was owned by Deutsche Bank. An important person at ABS was Buzzy Krongard. I have met him several times at the offices in Baltimore. Krongard had transferred to become executive director at the CIA. The option purchases, in which ABS was involved, occurred in the offices of ABS in Baltimore. The noise which occurred between Baltimore, New York City and Langley was interesting, as you can imagine, to say the least.
Under consideration here is the fact that Alex Brown, a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank (where many of the alleged 9/11 hijackers handled their banking transactions – for example Mohammed Atta) traded massive put options purchases on United Airlines Company UAL through the Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE) – „to the embarrassment of investigators“, as British newspaper The Independent reported. [7]
On September 12, the chairman of the board of Deutsche Bank Alex Brown, Mayo A Shattuck III, suddenly and quietly renounced his post, although he still had a three-year contract with an annual salary of several million US dollars. One could perceive that as somehow strange.
A few weeks later, the press spokesperson of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at that time, Tom Crispell, declined all comments, when he was contacted for a report for Ruppert´s website From the Wilderness, and had being asked „whether the Treasury Department or FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] had questioned CIA executive director and former Deutsche Bank-Alex Brown CEO [chief executive officer], A B ‚Buzzy‘ Krongard, about CIA monitoring of financial markets using PROMIS and his former position as overseer of Brown’s ‚private client‘ relations.“ [8]
Just before he was recruited personally by former CIA chief George Tenet for the CIA, Krongard supervised mainly private client banking at Alex Brown. [9]
In any case, after 9/11 on the first trading day, when the US stock markets were open again, the stock price of UAL declined by 43%. (The four aircraft hijacked on September 11 were American Airlines Flight 11, American Airlines Flight 77 and UAL flights 175 and 93.)
With his background as a former options trader, Keiser explained an important issue to me in that regard.
Max Keiser: Put options are, if they are employed in a speculative trade, basically bets that stock prices will drop abruptly. The purchaser, who enters a time-specific contract with a seller, does not have to own the stock at the time when the contract is purchased.
Related to the issue of insider trading via (put or call) options there is also a noteworthy definition by the Swiss economists Remo Crameri, Marc Chesney and Loriano Mancini, notably that an option trade may be „identified as informed“ – but is not yet (legally) proven – „when it is characterized by an unusual large increment in open interest and volume, induces large gains, and is not hedged in the stock market“. [10]
Open interest describes contracts which have not been settled (been exercised) by the end of the trading session, but are still open. Not hedged in the stock market means that the buyer of a (put or call) option holds no shares of the underlying asset, by which he might be able to mitigate or compensate losses if his trade doesn’t work out, or phrased differently: one does not hedge, because it is unnecessary, since one knows that the bet is one, pardon, „dead sure thing.“ (In this respect it is thus not really a bet, because the result is not uncertain, but a foregone conclusion.)
In this case, the vehicle of the calculation was „ridiculously cheap put options which give the holder the ‘right‘ for a period of time to sell certain shares at a price which is far below the current market price – which is a highly risky bet, because you lose money if at maturity the market price is still higher than the price agreed in the option. However, when these shares fell much deeper after the terrorist attacks, these options multiplied their value several hundred times because by now the selling price specified in the option was much higher than the market price. These risky games with short options are a sure indication for investors who knew that within a few days something would happen that would drastically reduce the market price of those shares.“ [11]
Software such as PROMIS in turn is used with the precise intent to monitor the stock markets in real time to track price movements that appear suspicious. Therefore, the US intelligence services must have received clear warnings from the singular, never before sighted transactions prior to 9/11.
Of great importance with regard to the track, which should lead to the perpetrators if you were seriously contemplating to go after them, is this:
Max Keiser: The Options Clearing Corporation has a duty to handle the transactions, and does so rather anonymously – whereas the bank that executes the transaction as a broker can determine the identity of both parties.
But that may have hardly ever been the intention of the regulatory authorities when the track led to, amongst others, Alvin Bernard „Buzzy“ Krongard, Alex Brown & Sons and the CIA. Ruppert, however, describes this case in Crossing the Rubicon in full length as far as possible. [12]
In addition, there are also ways and means for insiders to veil their tracks. In order to be less obvious,
„the insiders could trade small numbers of contracts. These could be traded under multiple accounts to avoid drawing attention to large trading volumes going through one single large account. They could also trade small volumes in each contract but trade more contracts to avoid drawing attention. As open interest increases, non-insiders may detect a perceived signal and increase their trading activity. Insiders can then come back to enter into more transactions based on a seemingly significant trade signal from the market. In this regard, it would be difficult for the CBOE to ferret out the insiders from the non-insiders, because both are trading heavily.“ [13]
The matter which needs clarification here is generally judged by Keiser as follows:
Max Keiser: My thought is that many (not all) of those who died on 9/11 were financial mercenaries – and we should feel the same about them as we feel about all mercenaries who get killed. The tragedy is that these companies mixed civilians with mercenaries, and that they were also killed. So have companies on Wall Street used civilians as human shields maybe?
According to a report by Bloomberg published in early October 2001, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began a probe into certain stock market transactions around 9/11 that included 38 companies, among them: American Airlines, United Airlines, Continental Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Boeing, Lockheed Martin Corp., American Express Corp., American International Group, AXA SA, Bank of America Corp., Bank of New York Corp., Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Morgan Stanley, General Motors and Raytheon. [14]
Por enquanto, tudo bem. In the same month, however, the San Francisco Chronicle newspaper reported that the SEC took the unprecedented step to deputize hundreds, if not even thousands of key stakeholders in the private sector for their investigation. In a statement that was sent to almost all listed companies in the US, the SEC asked the addressed companies to assign senior staff for the investigation, who would be aware of „the sensitive nature“ of the case and could be relied on to „exercise appropriate discretion“. [15]
In essence, it was about controlling information, not about provision and disclosure of facts. Such a course of action involves compromising consequences. Ruppert:
What happens when you deputize someone in a national security or criminal investigation is that you make it illegal for them to disclose publicly what they know. Jogada inteligente. In effect, they become government agents and are controlled by government regulations rather than their own conscience. In fact, they can be thrown into jail without a hearing if they talk publicly. I have seen this implied threat time after time with federal investigators, intelligence agents, and even members of United States Congress who are bound so tightly by secrecy oaths and agreements that they are not even able to disclose criminal activities inside the government for fear of incarceration. [16]
Among the reports about suspected insider trading which are mentioned in Crossing the Rubicon /From the Wilderness is a list that was published under the heading „Black Tuesday: The World’s Largest Insider Trading Scam?“ by the Israeli Herzliyya International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism on September 21, 2001:
Between September 6 and 7, the CBOE saw purchases of 4,744 put options on United Airlines, but only 396 call options. Assuming that 4,000 of the options were bought by people with advance knowledge of the imminent attacks, these „insiders“ would have profited by almost $5 million. On September 10, 4,516 put options on American Airlines were bought on the Chicago exchange, compared to only 748 calls. Again, there was no news at that point to justify this imbalance; again, assuming that 4,000 of these options trades represent „insiders“, they would represent a gain of about $4 million. [The levels of put options purchased above were more than six times higher than normal.] No similar trading in other airlines occurred on the Chicago exchange in the days immediately preceding Black Tuesday. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co, which occupied 22 floors of the World Trade Center, saw 2,157 of its October $45 put options bought in the three trading days before Black Tuesday; this compares to an average of 27 contracts per day before September 6. Morgan Stanley’s share price fell from $48.90 to $42.50 in the aftermath of the attacks. Assuming that 2,000 of these options contracts were bought based upon knowledge of the approaching attacks, their purchasers could have profited by at least $1.2 million. Merrill Lynch & amp; Co, with headquarters near the Twin Towers, saw 12,215 October $45 put options bought in the four trading days before the attacks; the previous average volume in those shares had been 252 contracts per day (a 1200% increase). When trading resumed, Merrill’s shares fell from $46.88 to $41.50; assuming that 11,000 option contracts were bought by „insiders“, their profit would have been about $5.5 million. European regulators are examining trades in Germany’s Munich Re, Switzerland’s Swiss Re, and AXA of France, all major reinsurers with exposure to the Black Tuesday disaster. (Note: AXA also owns more than 25% of American Airlines stock, making the attacks a „double whammy“ for them.) [17] Concerning the statements of the former chairman of the Deutsche Bundesbank Ernst Welteke, their tenor in various press reports put together is as follows:
German central bank president Ernst Welteke later reports that a study by his bank indicates, „There are ever clearer signs that there were activities on international financial markets that must have been carried out with the necessary expert knowledge,“ not only in shares of heavily affected industries such as airlines and insurance companies, but also in gold and oil. [Daily Telegraph, 9/23/2001] His researchers have found „almost irrefutable proof of insider trading“. [Miami Herald, 9/24/2001] „If you look at movements in markets before and after the attack, it makes your brow furrow. But it is extremely difficult to really verify it.“ Nevertheless, he believes that „in one or the other case it will be possible to pinpoint the source“. [Fox News, 9/22/2001] Welteke reports „a fundamentally inexplicable rise“ in oil prices before the attacks [Miami Herald, 9/24/2001] and then a further rise of 13 percent the day after the attacks. Gold rises nonstop for days after the attacks. [Daily Telegraph, 9/23/2001] [18]
Related to those observations, I sent a request via e-mail to the press office of the Deutsche Bundesbank on August 1, 2018, from which I was hoping to learn:
How did the Bundesbank deal with this information?
Did US federal agencies ask to see the study?
With whom did the Bundesbank share this information? And additionally:
Can you confirm that there is such a study of the Bundesbank concerning 9/11 insider trading, which was carried out in September 2001? If Yes: what is the title? If Yes: who were the authors? If Yes: has the study ever been made available to the public?
On August 2, I was then informed: „Your mail has been received by us and is being processed under the number 2018 / 011551.“ Ultimately, however, the press office of the Deutsche Bundesbank was only available for an oral explanation on the phone. With this explanation, I then turned to the press office of the federal financial regulator in Germany, the Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin, with the following e-mail – and that because of obvious reasons:
Yesterday, I sent a request (see end of this e-mail) to the press office of the Deutsche Bundesbank relating to insider trading connected to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and respectively relating to an alleged study carried by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The request carries the reference number 2018 / 011551.
The press office or respectively Mr Peter Trautmann was only available for an oral explanation. I repeat this now, because it is related to your entity. This will be followed by my further questions.
According to an oral explanation from the press office of the Deutsche Bundesbank, there has never been a detailed and official study on insider trading from the Bundesbank. Rather, there has been probably ad-hoc analysis with corresponding charts of price movements as briefings for the Bundesbank board. In addition, it would have been the duty of the Bundesfinanzaufsicht to investigate this matter. The press office of the Bundesbank was also not willing to give out any written information, not even after my hint that this alleged study by the Bundesbank has been floating around the Internet for years without any contradiction. That was the oral information from the Bundesbank press office, or respectively from Mr Peter Trautmann.
Now my questions for you:
Has the BaFin ever investigated the 9/11 insider trading? With what result? Have the results been made public? Have there not been any grounds for suspicion that would have justified an investigation, for example as damaged enterprise: Munich Re, and as buyers of put options of UAL’s United Airlines Company: Deutsche Bank/Alex Brown? Has the Deutsche Bundesbank ever enquired with BaFin what information they have regarding the 9/11 insider trading – for example for the creation of ad-hoc analysis for the Bundesbank? Have the US federal agencies ever inquired if the BaFin could cooperate with them in an investigation?
Could you reply to me in writing, unlike the Deutsche Bundesbank, please? I would be very grateful for that!
The next day I did indeed receive an e-mail concerning this topic from Anja Engelland, the press officer of the BaFin in which she answered my questions as follows:
Yes, the former Bundesaufsichtsamt fur Wertpapierhandel, BAWe (federal supervisory for securities trading), has carried out a comprehensive analysis of the operations. As a result, no evidence of insider trading has been found. Their approach and results have been published by the BAWe or BaFin in the annual reports for the years 2001 (cf S 26/27) and 2002 (cf p 156 above first paragraph). Aqui estão os links. [See here and here.] See annual reports 2001 and 2002. Put options on United Airlines were not traded on German stock exchanges (the first EUREX options on US equities were introduced only after the attacks on 9/11/2001); there were warrants on UAL and other US stocks, but those traded only in low volumes. Eu pessoalmente não sei sobre tal pedido. Furthermore, the Bundesbank itself would have to comment on this. BaFin is fundamentally entitled to the exchange of information with foreign supervisory authorities, like SEC, on the basis of written agreements, so-called memoranda of understanding (MoU). Regarding potential inquiries from foreign supervisory authorities, the BaFin can unfortunately not comment, this would be a matter of respective authority. For this I ask for understanding.
Then I wrote another brief note to BaFin, „in order to prevent any misunderstanding: your answers refers, as far as I understand, solely to the financial markets in Germany and Frankfurt, or not?“ The reply from BaFin:
The answers refer to the German financial market as a whole and not only on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. In terms of the assessment of foreign financial markets, the relevant authorities are the competent points of contact.
In my inquiries, I mentioned, among other things, a scientific study by US economist Allen M Poteshman from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, which had been carried out in 2006 regarding the put option trading around 9/11 related to the two airlines involved, United Airlines and American Airlines. Poteshman came to this conclusion:
„Examination of the option trading leading up to September 11 reveals that there was an unusually high level of put buying. This finding is consistent with informed investors having traded options in advance of the attacks.“ [19]
Another scientific study was conducted by the economists Wong Wing-Keung (Hong Kong Baptist University, HKBU), Howard E Thompson (University of Wisconsin) and Kweehong Teh (National University of Singapore, NUS), whose findings were published in April 2018 under the title „Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks?“
Motivated by the fact that there had been many media reports about possible insider trading prior to 9/11 in the option markets, the authors looked in this study at the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (SPX Index Options), in particular with a focus on strategies emanating from a bear market, namely those under the labels „Put Purchase,“ „Put Bear Spread“ and „Naked ITM Call Write“, as each of these are in accordance with the assumption that one would be betting on a general bear market if one wanted to profit in anticipation of the 9/11 event. [20]
Along these lines, the authors refer to an article which Erin E Arvedlund published on October 8, 2001, in Barron’s, the heading of which suggested precisely that thesis:
„Follow the money: Terror plotters could have benefited more from the fall of the entire market than from individual stocks.“ [21]
Basically, Wong, Thompson and Teh came to the conclusion „that our findings show that there was a significant abnormal increase in the trading volume in the option market just before the 9-11 attacks in contrast with the absence of abnormal trading volume far before the attacks“.
More specifically, they stated, „Our findings from the out-of-the-money (OTM), at-the-money (ATM) and in-the-money (ITM) SPX index put options and ITM SPX index call options lead us to reject the null hypotheses that there was no abnormal trading in these contracts before September 11th.“
Instead, they found evidence for „abnormal trading volume in OTM, ATM and ITM SPX index put options“ for September 2001, and also in „ITM-SPX index call options“ for the same month. „In addition, we find that there was evidence of abnormal trading in the September 2001 OTM, ATM and ITM SPX index put options immediately after the 9-11 attacks and before the expiration date. This suggests that owning a put was a valuable investment and those who owned them could sell them for a considerable profit before the expiration date.“
From all of this, they took the position that whilst they couldn’t definitively prove that insiders were active in the market, „our results provide credible circumstantial evidence to support the insider trading claim“. [22]
Disambiguation: „in the money“ means that the circumstances arise on which the owner of a put option is betting – the market price of the underlying asset, for example a stock (or in this case an index of shares), is lower at that moment compared to the price at the time when the transaction took place. „At the money“ means that the price of the underlying asset has remained equal or nearly equal. And „out-of-the-money“ means that the price of the underlying asset has gone up, so the opposite of what the owner of the put option was betting on took place. „In the money“: win. „Out of the money“: loss.
There are also ITM, ATM and OTM options both for trading strategies with put and call options, depending on which kind of risk one would like to take. For example, according to Wong, Thomson and Teh, the „Put-Purchase Strategy“ in the case of a downward movement of the underlying asset „is a cheaper alternative to short-selling of the underlying asset and it is the simplest way to profit when the price of the underlying asset is expected to decline“.
The use of the OTM put option compared to the ITM put option, however, offers „both higher reward and higher risk potentials (…) if the underlying asset falls substantially in price. However, should the underlying asset decline only moderately in price, the ITM put often proves to be the better choice (…) because of the relative price differential.“
That is why speculators would fare best, if they bought ITM put options, „unless the speculators would expect a very substantial decline in the price of the underlying asset.“ [23]
After they calculated such strategies in the light of the available trading data in the CBOE relating to 9/11, the three economists ultimately do not accept a possible counter-argument that their results could be attributed to the fact that the stock markets were generally falling and that there had already been a negative market outlook. Finally they pointed out: „More conclusive evidence is needed to prove definitively that insiders were indeed active in the market. Although we have discredited the possibility of abnormal volume due to the declining market, such investigative work would still be a very involved exercise in view of the multitude of other confounding factors,“ such as confusing trading strategies, „intentionally employed by the insiders“ in order to attract less attention. [24]
That would be – and if only to invalidate these scientific results once and for all – primarily a task for the SEC, the FBI and other governmental authorities of the United States. However, we will have to wait for this in vain.
I think that not less worthy of a mention is an article that the French financial magazine Les Echos published in September 2007 about a study conducted by two independent economics professors from the University of Zurich, Marc Chesney and Loriano Mancini. Journalist Marina Alcaraz summarized the content of the findings in Les Echos with these words and with these explanations by Professor Chesney, which I for the first time translated into German (and do now translate from French into English):
The atypical volumes, which are very rare for specific stocks lead to the suspicion of insider trading.“ Six years after the attacks on the World Trade Center this is the disturbing results of a recent study by Marc Chesney and Loriano Mancini, professors at the University of Zurich. The authors, one of them a specialist in derivative products, the other a specialist in econometrics, worked on the sales options that were used to speculate on the decline in the prices of 20 large American companies, particularly in the aerospace and financial sector.
Their analysis refers to the execution of transactions between the 6th and 10th of September 2001 compared to the average volumes, which were collected over a long period (10 years for most of the companies). In addition, the two specialists calculated the probability that different options within the same sector in significant volumes would be traded within a few days. „We have tried to see if the movements of specific stocks shortly before the attacks were normal.“ We show that the movements for certain companies such as American Airlines, United Airlines, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, Citigroup, Marsh & McLehnan are rare from a statistical point of view, especially when compared to the quantities that have been observed for other assets like Coca-Cola or HP,“ explains Marc Chesney, a former Professor at the HEC and co-author of Blanchiment et financement du terrorisme ( Money laundering and financing of terrorism ), published by Editions Ellipses. „For example 1,535 put option contracts on American Airlines with a strike of $30 and expiry in October 2001 were traded on September 10th, in contrast to a daily average of around 24 contracts over the previous three weeks. The fact that the market was currently in a bear market is not sufficient to explain these surprising volumes.
The authors also examined the profitability of the put options and trades for an investor who acquired such a product between the 6th and 10th September. „For specific titles, the profits were enormous.“ „For example, the investors who acquired put options on Citigroup with an expiry in October 2001 could have made more than $15 million profit,“ he said. On the basis of the connection of data between volumes and profitability, the two authors conclude that „the probability that crimes by Insiders (Insider trading) occurred , is very strong in the cases of American Airlines, United Airlines, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, Citigroup and JP Morgan. „There is no legal evidence, but these are the results of statistical methods, confirming the signs of irregularities.“ [25]
As Alcaraz continued to state for Les Echos, the study by Chesney/Mancini about possible insider trading related to the 9/11 attacks was not the first of its kind; but it was in sharp contrast to the findings of the US Securities and Exchange Commission SEC and the 9/11 Commission, since they classified the insider trading as negligible – the trades in question had no connection to 9/11 and had „consistently proved innocuous“.
Different in the assessment is also the scientific work that Chesney and Mancini had published together with Remo Crameri in April 2018 at the University of Zurich, „Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the option markets.“ In the segment that is dedicated to the terror attacks of 9/11, the three authors come to the conclusion, that there had been notable insider trading shortly before the terrorist attacks on September 11 that was based on prior knowledge.
Without elaborating on the detailed explanation of the mathematical and statistical method, which the scientific trio applied during the examination of the put option transactions on the CBOE for the period between 1996 and 2006, I summarize some of their significant conclusions.
Companies like American Airlines, United Airlines, Boeing” – the latter company is a contractor of the two airlines as aircraft manufacturer – „and to a lesser extent, Delta Air Lines and KLM seem to have been targets for informed trading activities in the period leading up to the attacks. The number of new put options issued during that period is statistically high and the total gains realized by exercising these options amount to more than $16 million. These findings support the results by Poteshman (2006) who also reports unusual activities in the option market before the terrorist attacks.[26]
In the banking sector, Chesney, Crameri and Mancini found five informed trading activities in connection to 9/11. „For example the number of new put options with underlying stock in Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan and Merrill Lynch issued in the days before the terrorist attacks was at an unusually high level. The realized gains from such trading strategies are around $11 million. [27]
For both areas, the aviation and the banking sector, the authors state that „in nearly all cases the hypothesis“, that the put options were not hedged, cannot be rejected. [28]
Regarding the options traded on EUREX, one of the world’s largest trading places for derivatives, which in 1998 resulted from the merger between the German and Swiss futures exchanges DTB and SOFFEX, Chesney, Mancini and Crameri focused on two reinsurance companies, which incurred costs in terms of billions of dollars in connection with the World Trade Center catastrophe: Munich Re and Swiss Re.
On the basis of EUREX trading data provided by Deutsche Bank, the three scientists detected one informed option trade related to Munich Re, which occurred on August 30, 2001. The authors write:
The detected put option with underlying Munich Re matured at the end of September 2001 and had a strike of € 320 (the underlying asset was traded at € 300, 86 on August 30th). That option shows a large increment in open interest of 996 contracts (at 92.2% quintile of its two-year empirical distribution) on August 30th.
Its price on that day was € 10, 22. … On the day of the terrorist attacks, the underlying stock lost more than 15% (the closing price on September 10th was € 261, 88 and on September 11th € 220, 53) and the option price jumped to € 89, 56, corresponding to a return of 776% in eight trading days. … The gains … related to the exercise of the 996 new put options issued on August 30th correspond to more than 3.4 million.“ Similar is true, according to the authors, for one informed option trade on Swiss Re on August 20, 2001 with „a return of 4,050% in three trading weeks“, or „more than € 8 million. [29]
In a new version of their study that was published on September 7, 2018, the authors stuck to their findings from April 2018. They added the emphasis that in no way the profits gained with the put options to which they point could have been achieved due to sheer fortunate coincidence, but that in fact they were based on prior knowledge which had been exploited. [30]
With those results in terms of what went on at the EUREX according to Chesney, Crameri and Mancini, I again addressed the BaFin, which had written to me that for the financial centers in Germany insider trading around 9/11 could be excluded, and asked:
How does this go with your information that the federal supervisory for securities trading (BAWe) could in its comprehensive analysis not find evidence for insider trading? Do the authors, so to speak, see ghosts with no good reason?
In addition, I stated:
If it is true what Chesney, Crameri and Mancini write, or if you at the BaFin cannot (ad hoc) refute it, would this then cause the BaFin to thoroughly investigate the matter again? If the findings of Chesney, Crameri, and Mancini were true, this would constitute illegal transactions relating to a capital crime, which has no status of limitations, or not?
In case that a need for clarification had arisen at the BaFin, I added Professor Chesney to my e-mail-inquiry in the „carbon copy“ – address field, as because these were the results of his scientific work.
The response that I received from BaFin employee Dominika Kula was as follows:
As I already told you in my e-mail, the former federal supervisory for securities trading (BAWe) carried out a comprehensive analysis of the operations in 2001. As a result, no evidence of insider trading has been found. For clarification purposes, I wish to point out that violations of statutory provisions of securities or criminal law can never be excluded with absolute certainty. In order to pursue and prosecute such matters concrete evidence of an unlawful act is required … Such evidence does not exist here.
With regard to the sources you mentioned, I ask for understanding that I can neither comment on scientific analyses, nor on reviews by third parties.
Regarding the statutes of limitations for offences relating to the violation insider trading regulations trading I can give you the following information: A violation of the law to prohibit insider trading is punishable with imprisonment up to 5 years or with fines. The statutes of limitations applied for crimes carrying this kind of penalty (section 78 paragraph 3 No. 4 Penal Code) are five years. These limitations are described in the statutes of limitations (§§ 78 et seq.) (Criminal Code).
In addition, I turned to the EUREX with three questions:
How do you as EUREX comment on the findings of Messrs Chesney, Mancini and Crameri? Did you at EUREX perceive the particular trading in Munich Re and Swiss Re it in any way as strange? Have domestic (eg BAWe and BaFin) or foreign (such as the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission) authorities ever inquired if there may have been evidence of insider trading via the EUREX in connection with the 9/11 attacks?
I subsequently received the following response from Heiner Seidel, the deputy head of the press office of the Deutsche Borse in Frankfurt.
We do not give you a public written response on behalf of the Deutsche Börse or Eurex regarding the topics of your inquiry. This is for the following reason: the trade monitoring agency (HüSt) is part of the Exchange, but it is independent and autonomous. Their investigations are confidential and are carried out in close coordination with the BaFin. They are never public, a request which HüSt is therefore not meaningful.
I leave it to the reader to draw his/her conclusions from these two replies from the press offices of BaFin and Deutsche Borse. Regarding the topic of option trades related to 9/11, I once more talked with Swiss historian Dr Daniele Ganser („Operation Gladio“), by asking him this time about the importance of those put options, which were traded shortly before the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Daniele Ganser: This is an important point. This is about demonstrating that there was insider trading on the international stock exchanges before 11 September. Specifically put options, ie speculation on falling stock prices were traded. Among the affected stocks were United Airlines and American Airlines, the two airlines involved in the attacks.
A colleague of mine, Marc Chesney, professor at the Institute of banking at the University of Zurich, has examined these put options. You first of all have to check if there may have been international speculation that the aviation industry would be experiencing a weak period and whether accordingly also put options on Singapore Airlines, Lufthansa and Swiss were bought. This was not the case.
Very significant put option trades were only transacted for these two airlines involved in the attacks. Secondly, you must examine the ratio of put options to call options and look if they had also been purchased to a similarly significant extent that would constitute speculations on rising stock prices. And that is also not the case. There were only significant put options and only significant transactions for United Airlines and American Airlines.
Now you need to look further in order to see who actually bought the put options, because that would be the insider who made millions on September 11. Most people are unaware that money was also earned with the attacks on September 11. The Security and Exchange Commission, SEC, the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States, however, does not publish the information on who bought the put options, because you can do this anonymously. It is disturbing that this data is not made public.
What you have is the 9/11 Commission report, and here it is pointed out , that there has been insider trading, but that this insider trading cannot be traced to [al-Qaeda leader] Osama bin Laden, which means that it is highly unlikely that it had been Bin Laden.
Question: If this is not pursued any further, what does it mean?
Daniele Ganser: This means that the investigation of the terrorist attacks was incomplete, and always at the point where there are contradictions to the SURPRISE story, no further investigations are made. It looks very much as if one wants to examine only one story, the investigation is therefore one-sided. But this does not only apply to the put options. [31]
Interestingly enough, when Dr Ganser points out in his reply that this important data is not published, it is actually only half of the truth. Por quê? The answer is very simple and odd at the same time: David Callahan, the editor of the US magazine SmartCEO, filed a request to the SEC about the put options which occurred prior to September 11 within the framework of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The SEC informed Callahan in its reply of December 23, 2009 under the number „09 07659-FOIA“ as follows:
This letter is in response to your request seeking access to and copies of the documentary evidence referred to in footnote 130 of Chapter 5 of the September 11 (9/11) Commission Report… We have been advised that the potentially responsive records have been destroyed. [32]
Therefore, we will unfortunately never know exactly how the SEC and the 9/11 Commission came to their conclusions regarding the 9/11 put options trading for their final report, because relevant documents were not only held back, but also destroyed – and that in spite of an agreement between the SEC and the National Archive of the United States, in which the SEC has agreed to keep all records for at least 25 years. [33]
The 9/11 Commission report wrote this in footnote 130 of Chapter 5, which briefly focuses on the alleged insider trading:
Highly publicized allegations of insider trading in advance of 9 / 11 generally rest on reports of unusual pre-9/11 trading activity in companies whose stock plummeted after the attacks. Some unusual trading did in fact occur, but each such trade proved to have an innocuous explanation. For example, the volume of put options – investments that pay off only when a stock drops in price – surged in the parent companies of United Airlines on September 6 and American Airlines on September 10 – highly suspicious trading on its face.
Yet, further investigation has revealed that the trading had no connection with 9/11. A single US-based institutional investor with no conceivable ties to al-Qaeda purchased 95 percent of the UAL puts on September 6 as part of a trading strategy that also included buying 115,000 shares of American on September 10. Similarly, much of the seemingly suspicious trading in American on September 10 was traced to a specific US-based options trading newsletter, faxed to its subscribers on Sunday, September 9, which recommended these trades.
These examples typify the evidence examined by the investigation. The SEC and the FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities industry, devoted enormous resources to investigating this issue, including securing the cooperation of many foreign governments. These investigators have found that the apparently suspicious consistently proved innocuous. (Joseph Cella interview (Sept 16, 2003; May 7, 2004; May 10-11, 2004); FBI briefing (Aug 15, 2003); SEC memo, Division of Enforcement to SEC Chair and Commissioners, „Pre-September 11, 2001 Trading Review,“ May 15, 2002; Ken Breen interview (Apr. 23, 2004); Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
The author Mark H Gaffney commented on this finding of “innocuousness”:
Notice … the commission makes no mention in its footnote of the 36 other companies identified by the SEC in its insider trading probe. What about the pre-9/11 surge in call options for Raytheon, for instance, or the spike in put options for the behemoth Morgan Stanley, which had offices in WTC 2? The 9/11 Commission Report offers not one word of explanation about any of this. The truth, we must conclude, is to be found between the lines in the report’s conspicuous avoidance of the lion’s share of the insider trading issue.
Indeed, if the trading was truly „innocuous“, as the report states, then why did the SEC muzzle potential whistleblowers by deputizing everyone involved with its investigation? The likely answer is that so many players on Wall Street were involved that the SEC could not risk an open process, for fear of exposing the unthinkable. This would explain why the SEC limited the flow of information to those with a „need to know“, which, of course, means that very few participants in the SEC investigation had the full picture.
It would also explain why the SEC ultimately named no names. All of which hints at the true and frightening extent of criminal activity on Wall Street in the days and hours before 9/11. The SEC was like a surgeon who opens a patient on the operating room table to remove a tumor, only to sew him back up again after finding that the cancer has metastasized through the system.
At an early stage of its investigation, perhaps before SEC officials were fully aware of the implications, the SEC did recommend that the FBI investigate two suspicious transactions. We know about this thanks to a 9/11 Commission memorandum declassified in May 2009 which summarizes an August 2003 meeting at which FBI agents briefed the commission on the insider trading issue. The document indicates that the SEC passed the information about the suspicious trading to the FBI on September 21, 2001, just ten days after the 9/11 attacks.
Although the names in both cases are censored from the declassified document, thanks to some nice detective work by Kevin Ryan we know whom (in one case) the SEC was referring to. The identity of the suspicious trader is a stunner that should have become prime-time news on every network, world-wide. Kevin Ryan was able to fill in the blanks because, fortunately, the censor left enough details in the document to identify the suspicious party who, as it turns out, was none other than Wirt Walker III, a distant cousin to then-president G W Bush.
Several days before 9/11, Walker and his wife Sally purchased 56,000 shares of stock in Stratesec, one of the companies that provided security at the World Trade Center up until the day of the attacks. Notably, Stratesec also provided security at Dulles International Airport, where AA 77 took off on 9/11, and also security for United Airlines, which owned two of the other three allegedly hijacked aircraft. At the time, Walker was a director of Stratesec. Amazingly, Bush’s brother Marvin was also on the board.
Walker’s investment paid off handsomely, gaining $50,000 in value in a matter of a few days. Given the links to the World Trade Center and the Bush family, the SEC lead should have sparked an intensive FBI investigation. Yet, incredibly, in a mind-boggling example of criminal malfeasance, the FBI concluded that because Walker and his wife had „no ties to terrorism … there was no reason to pursue the investigation.“ The FBI did not conduct a single interview. [34]
For this translation, I asked Kevin Ryan via e-mail if he could send me a link for his „nice detective work“. Ryan, who’s in my humble opinion one of roughly 10 people around the world who have to be taken seriously regarding 9/11, replied:
You are referring to my paper „Evidence for Informed Trading on the Attacks of September 11.“ [See here.] The following two references from the paper are relevant to what you are describing. [2] 9/11 Commission memorandum entitled „FBI Briefing on Trading“, prepared by Doug Greenburg, 18 August 2003, [22].
The 9/11 Commission memorandum that summarized the FBI investigations refers to the traders involved in the Stratesec purchase. From the references in the document, we can make out that the two people had the same last name and were related. This fits the description of Wirt and Sally Walker, who were known to be stock holders in Stratesec. Additionally, one (Wirt) was a director at the company, a director at a publicly traded company in Oklahoma (Aviation General), and chairman of an investment firm in Washington, DC (Kuwam Corp). Here are two other recent articles on Stratesec and its operators. [See here and here.]
The stock of Stratesec, I should add by myself, increased in value from $0.75 per share on September 11 to $1.49 per share when the market re-opened on September 17. As a firm that provides technology-based security for large commercial and government facilities, Stratesec benefited from the soaring demand of security companies right after 9/11.
It is also remarkable what Ryan wrote to me regarding a company on which he did some research, too: Viisage Corp, another high-tech security firm.
Kevin Ryan: In late 2005, George Tenet became a director for Viisage, which had been flagged by the SEC for 9/11 trading but never investigated. Viisage was led by Roger LaPenta, formerly of Lockheed.
Seven months later, in 2006, FBI director Louis Freeh also joined the Viisage board. One might think that when both the CIA director (on 9/11) and the FBI director (from 1993 to June 2001) joined a company suspected of 9/11 insider trading, we might want to go back and actually investigate the SEC’s flagging of that company. But, of course, that was not the case. In 2009, „Bandar Bush“ hired Freeh as his personal attorney.
Freeh is nowadays the bankruptcy trustee of the alleged market manipulator MF Global. And about his client, the former Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar, I should add that we know for sure that he bankrolled indirectly via his wife two of the alleged would-be 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi. [35]
But let’s get back to the subject of destruction. On September 11, not only human life, aircraft and buildings were destroyed in New York City, but also data on computers and in archives. For example, several federal agencies occupied space in Building 7 of the World Trade Center, including the Securities and Exchange Commission on floors 11 to 13.
Those and other data could have given information about the alleged 9/11 insider trading (though it seems to be very unlikely that no backup existed elsewhere independent of the local computer systems). In fact, some technology companies were commissioned to recover damaged hard disks, which had been recovered from the debris and dust of Ground Zero.
One of these companies was the English company group Convar, more precisely: their data rescue center in the German city Pirmasens. Erik Kirschbaum from the news agency Reuters reported in December 2001 that Convar had at that time successfully restored information from 32 computers, supporting „suspicions that some of the 911 transactions were illegal“.
“The suspicion is that inside information about the attack was used to send financial transaction commands and authorizations in the belief that amid all the chaos the criminals would have, at the very least, a good head start,‘ says Convar director Peter Henschel.”[36] Convar received the costly orders – according to Kirschbaum´s report the companies had to pay between $20,000 and $30,000 per rescued computer – in particular from credit card companies, because: “There was a sharp rise in credit card transactions moving through some computer systems at the WTC shortly before the planes hit the twin towers. This could be a criminal enterprise – in which case, did they get advance warning? Or was it only a coincidence that more than $100 million was rushed through the computers as the disaster unfolded?”[37]
The companies for which Convar was active cooperated with the FBI. If the data were reconstructed they should have been passed on to the FBI, and the FBI, according to its statutory mandate, should have initiated further investigation based on the data to find out who carried out these transactions. Henschel was optimistic at the time that the sources for the transactions would come to light.
Richard Wagner, a Convar employee, told Kirschbaum that „illegal transfers of more than $100 million might have been made immediately before and during the disaster. ‚There is a suspicion that some people had advance knowledge of the approximate time of the plane crashes in order to move out amounts exceeding $100 million,‘ he says. ‚They thought that the records of their transactions could not be traced after the main frames were destroyed‘.“ [38]
Wagner’s observation that there had been „illegal financial transactions shortly before and during the WTC disaster“ matches an observation which Ruppert describes in Crossing the Rubicon . Ruppert was contacted by an employee of Deutsche Bank, who survived the WTC disaster by leaving the scene when the second aircraft had hit its target.
According to the employee, about five minutes before the attack the entire Deutsche Bank computer system had been taken over by something external that no one in the office recognized and every file was downloaded at lightning speed to an unknown location. The employee, afraid for his life, lost many of his friends on September 11, and he was well aware of the role which the Deutsche Bank subsidiary Alex Brown had played in insider trading. [39]
I was curious and wanted more information from Convar regarding their work on the WTC-computer hard drives, but also about the statements made by Peter Henschel and Richard Wagner. Thus, I contacted the agency which represents Convar for press matters, with a written request. But their agency „ars publicandi“ informed me swiftly:
Due to time constraints, we can currently offer you neither information nor anyone on the part of our client to talk to regarding this requested topic.
I also approached KrollOntrack, a very interesting competitor of Convar in writing. Ontrack Data Recovery, which also has subsidiaries in Germany, was purchased in 2002 by Kroll Inc – „one of the nation’s most powerful private investigative and security firms, which has long-standing involvement with executive protection US government officials including the president. This would require close liaison with the Secret Service.“ [40]
At the time of the 9/11 attacks, a certain Jerome Hauer was one of the managing directors at Kroll Inc. He had previously established the crisis center for the mayor of New York City as director of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which occupied office space on the 23rd floor of the WTC Building 7. Hauer helped former FBI agent John O’Neill to get the post of the head of Security Affairs at the WTC, and spent the night of September 11 with O’Neill in New York before the latter lost his life on September 11 in the WTC. Hauer was most likely involved in the planning of „Tripod II“, the war game exercise at the port of New York City. [41]
Therefore, I found it appealing to uncover some more details of this aspect, or, more accurately to find out if Ontrack or KrollOntrack had received an order in 2001 or after to rescue computer hard drives from the WTC. The answer I received from KrollOntrack said:
Kroll Ontrack was not at the site of the data recovery – the devices at the Twin Towers have been completely destroyed or vaporized. The firm Kroll was, however, at that time active in the field of computer-forensic investigations, securing devices in the surrounding buildings.
In essence, these two inquiries did not help me at all. If anything, a further question arose: why did KrollOntrack send me a response, where it was really obvious that the content did not match the facts? After all, I had written in my inquiry that Convar had received orders to restore damaged computer hard drives from the World Trade Center.
I sent a new inquiry, attaching a link for Erik Kirschbaum’s Reuters article and additional cinematic reports on Convar’s which showed that some of the WTC disks had not been „completely destroyed or vaporized“. I stated to KrollOntrack: „Your answer does not seem to match the facts, when it comes to ‚completely destroyed or vaporized‘. Will you still stick to your answer?“
KrollOntrack then replied that their previously given assessment constituted „not a statement, but an opinion“.
I do not find this assessment worthless, because it is in line with the knowledge of the general public and can easily be refuted in argumentum in contrario by Convar´s activities.
One film report to which I referred to in my second inquiry to KrollOntrack originated from the German television journal Heute-Journal broadcast on March 11, 2002, on ZDF, and the other from the Dutch TV documentary Zembla, broadcast on September 10, 2006.
The ZDF report showed that Convar received the WTC disks from the US Department of Defense and that Convar had managed until March 2002 to recover more than 400 hard drives. It also reported that the private companies that employed Convar had paid between $25,000 and $50,000 per hard drive. In the TV documentary Zembla, Convar essentially maintained its position as it had been reported by Erik Kirschbaum in 2001.
Obviously, in connection with 9/11 there has not only been insider trading via put options, but there is additional evidence that there have been illegal financial transactions via credit cards through which more than 100 million US dollars were removed from the WTC computer systems.
Those occurred shortly before and during the WTC disaster. It remains unclear what the FBI did later on with the data recovered by Convar. On the other hand, it may have been not very much, as can be seen from a memorandum from the 9/11 Commission, which was released in May 2009.
The 9/11 Commission asked the FBI about the use of credit cards for insider dealing. On the basis of the information provided by the FBI, the commission came to the conclusion that no such activity occurred because „the assembled agents expressed no knowledge of the reported hard-drive recovery effort or the alleged scheme“ – but above all „everything at the WTC was pulverized to near powder, making it extremely unlikely that any hard-drives survived“. [42]
The activities of Convar, however, prove the exact opposite.
But it gets even better. According to Zembla, the FBI was directly involved with the data rescue efforts of Convar. And on top of it, the broadcast of Heute-Journal reported that Convar worked in that „highly sensitive“ matter with several federal agencies of the United States government.
So there have been ample indications for insider trading based on foreknowledge of the attacks, but there are very few hard facts as Catherine Austin Fitts, a former managing director and member of the board of the Wall Street investment bank Dillon, Read & Co, Inc (now part of UBS), pointed out when I talked with her about this topic.
Ms Fitts, what are your general thoughts related to the alleged 9/11-insider trading?
Catherine Austin Fitts: Well, I’ve never been able to see concrete evidence that the insider trading has been proved. There’s a lot of anecdotal information from investment bankers and people in the investment community that indicate that there was significant insider trading, particularly in the currency and bond markets, but again it hasn’t been documented.
I think around situations like 9/11 we’ve seen things that can only be explained as insider trading. Therefore, it wouldn’t surprise me if it turns out the allegations are true, because my suspicion is that 9/11 was an extremely profitable covert operation and a lot of the profits came from the trading. It wouldn’t even surprise me if it turns out that the Exchange Stabilization Fund traded it and that some of the funding for the compensation fund for the victims came from the ESF.
Insider trading happens around these kinds of events, but if you really want to produce evidence of insider trading, you need the subpoena powers of the SEC, and of course we know that they haven’t exercised them. If anything, right after 9/11, the government settled a significant amount of cases I presume because a lot of the documents were destroyed by the destruction of WTC building number 7, where the SEC offices and other governmental investigation offices were. [43]
Fitts, who had written a longer essay in 2004 related to this, replied to my question about who had benefited from 9/11:
Catherine Austin Fitts: 9/11 was extraordinarily profitable for Wall Street, they of course got a kind of „Get Out of Jail Free card“ as I’ve just described. In addition, the largest broker of government bonds, Cantor Fitzgerald, was destroyed, and there was a great deal of money missing from the federal government in the prior four or five years. If you look at the amount of funds involved, it is hard to come to a conclusion other than massive securities fraud was involved, so I find it very interesting that this happened. [44]
A short explanation: Cantor Fitzgerald’s headquarters were located in the North Tower of the WTC (floors 101-105). On 9/11, the company lost nearly two-thirds of its entire workforce, more than any other tenant in the WTC. (Also two other government bonds brokers, Garbon Inter Capital and Eurobrokers, occupied office space in the WTC towers that were destroyed.) Back to Fitts and the question: „Cui bono 9/11?“
Catherine Austin Fitts: In addition, the federal government took the position that they couldn’t produce audited financial statements after 9/11, because they said the office at the Pentagon that produced financial statements was destroyed. Now given what I know of the federal set up of financial statements, I am skeptical of that statement.
But needless to say, if you take the government on its word, you had another „Get Out of Jail Free card“ for four trillion dollars and more missing from the federal government. So if you’re just looking at the financial fraud angle, there were a lot of parties that benefited from 9/11. But then of course what 9/11 did, it staged the passage of the Patriot Act and a whole series of laws and regulations that I collectively refer to as „The Control on Concentration of Cash Flow Act.“ It gave incredible powers to centralize.
In addition, if you look at monetary policies right after 9/11 – I remember I was over in the City of London driving around with a money manager and his phone rang and he answered it on his speaker phone. It was somebody on Wall Street who he hadn’t talked to since before 9/11, and he said to him:
“Oh Harry, I am so sorry about what has happened, it must have been very traumatic.” And the guy said: “Don’t be ridiculous! We were able to borrow cheap short and invest long, we’re running a huge arbitrage, we’re making a fortune, this is the most profitable thing that ever happened to us!” – So you could tell the monetary policies and sort of insider games were just pumping profits into the bank at that time, so that was very profitable.
But of course the big money was used for a significant movement of the military abroad and into Afghanistan and then into Iraq … You could see that the country was being prepared to go to war. And sure enough, 9/11 was used as a justification to go to war in Afghanistan, to go to war in Iraq, and commit a huge number of actions, and now much of the challenges about the budget are the result of extraordinary expenditures on war including in Afghanistan and Iraq and the costs of moving the army abroad and engaging in this kind of empire building with ground military force.
So I think if you ask Cui Bono on 9/11, one of the big categories was all the people who made money on engineering the popular fear they needed to engineer these wars. I believe whether it was financial fraud, engineering new laws or engineering wars, it was a fantastically profitable covert operation. [45]
In that category of people who benefit from 9/11 are also the arms manufacturer Raytheon, whose share price gained directly from the 9/11 attacks. Trading of the shares of Raytheon, the producer of Tomahawk and Patriot missiles (and parent company of E-systems, whose clients include the National Security Agency and CIA), experienced an abrupt six-time increase of call option purchases on the day immediately before September 11. [46]
The outright purchase of call options implies the expectation that a stock price will rise. In the first week after 9/11, when the New York Stock Exchange opened again, the value of Raytheon actually shot up considerably. Looking at the development of the stock price, the impression is a very weak performance before the attacks – and then, after resumption of trade, a „gap“ (at substantial volume) upwards. In other words: just under $25 on September 10, the low in the period between August 20 to September 28, at $31, 50 on September 17 and up to $34,80 on September 27, 2001.
With regards to government bonds, buyers of US Treasury securities with a maturity of five years were also winners. These securities were traded in an unusually large volume shortly before the attacks. The Wall Street Journal reported at least in early October 2001 that the Secret Service had started an investigation into a suspiciously high volume of US government bond purchases before the attacks. The Wall Street Journal explained:
Five-year Treasury bills are the best investments in the event of a global crisis, in particular one like this which has hit the United States. The papers are treasured because of their safety, and because they are covered by the US government, and usually their prices rise if investors shun riskier investments, such as shares. [47]
Adding to this phenomenon, the government issues these bonds that serve as a basis of money creation for funding a war such as the immediately declared „war on terror“, engaging the Tomahawks from Raytheon. And here it may again be useful to have a quick look at the „cui bono“ relationship:
The US Federal Reserve creates money to fund the war and lends it to the American government. The American government in turn must pay interest on the money they borrow from the Central Bank to fund the war. The greater the war appropriations, the greater the profits are for bankers. [48]
A multi-layered combination, one could say.
I also talked about the topic of 9/11 insider trading with one of the world’s leading practitioners at the interface between the international capital markets, the national security policy of the US as well as geopolitics, James G Rickards. He gave me some answers in a personal discussion, which I am allowed to repeat here with his expressed approval.
Question: Did suspicious trading activities of uncovered put options on futures markets occur shortly before 9/11?
James G Rickards: Well, the trading documents certainly look suspicious. It is simply a fact that an unusually high volume of purchases of put-options for the two airlines occurred over the three trading days before the attacks. This is a mere fact, no speculation, no guessing around. This is clearly obvious from the documents of the trading sessions on the derivatives exchanges.
Question: Do you think that the intelligence agencies could have got a warning signal based on this information?
James G Rickards: Theoretically that is possible, if are you are looking and watching out for this. But there was far more significant information, which was ignored.
Question: Do you also think that some people with foreknowledge operated speculatively in the option markets?
James G Rickards: Based on the documentation of the trading session it seems that this has been the case, yes.
Let’s sum up a bit at the end. We have, among other things:
The „nice detective work“ by Kevin Ryan related to Stratesec/Wirt Walker III. Some highly inconsistent information vis-a-vis Convar/illegal credit card transactions. Scientific papers supporting the allegations that there were indeed unusual trading activities in the option market before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, although the 9/11 Commission (based on the investigation of the SEC and the FBI) ruled that possibility out.
As it became clear that I would publish this article here at Asia Times Online, I contacted the US Federal Bureau of Investigation via its press spokesman Paul Bresson in order „to give the FBI the opportunity to give a public statement with regards to three specific issues“. Those three specific issues were the ones I have just highlighted. Related to each of them I’ve asked Mr Bresson/the FBI: „Could you comment on this for the public, please?“ Up to this moment, Mr Bresson/the FBI did not respond to my inquiry in any way whatsoever. Does this come as a surprise?
I’ve also got back in touch with „ars publicandi“, the firm that does public relations for Convar in Germany. The response said: „Unfortunately I have to inform you that the status has not changed, and that Convar considers the issue of 9/11 as dead in general.“
As you have read, the status in August of last year was slightly different.
At the end of this article, I should perhaps mention that this research ultimately led to negative consequences for me. After I contacted the FBI, I was informed by the publisher of a German financial website, for which I conducted interviews for a professional fee (and had already prepared more work), that no further cooperation was possible. Now that I will come in one way or another into the focus of the FBI, any association with me would be undesirable.
Well, you know the rules.
As far as the abnormal option trades around 9/11 are concerned, I want to give Max Keiser the last word in order to point out the significance of the story.
Max Keiser: Regardless of who did it, we can know that more than a few had advance warning – the trading in the option market makes that clear.
[1] Compare Michael C. Ruppert: “Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age Of Oil“, New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island, 2004, page 152.
[2] Ibid., page 153.
[3] Ibid., page 154 – 155.
[4] Ibid., page 170.
[5] Ibid., page 238 – 253: “9/11 Insider Trading, or ‘You Didn’t Really See That, Even Though We Saw It.’“
[6] Ibid., page 239.
[7] Compare Chris Blackhurst: “Mystery of terror ‘insider dealers’”, published at The Independent on October 4, 2001 under:
[8] Compare “Profits of Death“, published at From the Wilderness on December 6, 2001 under:
[9] For the fact, that it was George Tenet who recruited Krongard, compare George Tenet: “At the Center of the Storm”, Harper Collins, New York, 2007, page 19.
[10] Compare Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri and Loriano Mancini: “Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the Option Markets”, University of Zurich, April 2018, online at:
[11] Nafeez M. Ahmed: „Geheimsache 09/11. Hintergründe über den 11. September und die Logik amerikanischer Machtpolitik“, Goldmann Verlag, Munich, 2004, page 182. (Translated back into English from German.)
[12] Compare Michael C. Ruppert: “Crossing the Rubicon“, page 244 – 247.
[13] Wing-Keung Wong, Howard E. Thompson und Kweehong Teh: “Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks?”, published at Social Sciences Research Network, April 2018, under:
[14] Compare “Bank of America among 38 stocks in SEC’s attack probe”, published at Bloomberg News on October 3, 2001, archived under:
[15] Michael C. Ruppert: “Crossing the Rubicon“, page 243.
[17] “Suppressed Details of Criminal Insider Trading Lead Directly into the CIA’s Highest Ranks”, published at From the Wilderness on October 9, 2001 under:
[18] Compare “Early September 2001: Almost Irrefutable Proof of Insider Trading in Germany”, published at History Commons under:
[19] Allen M. Poteshman: “Unusual Option Market Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001”, published in The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, 2006, Vol. 79, Edição 4, página 1703-1726.
[20] Wing-Keung Wong, Howard E. Thompson und Kweehong Teh: “Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks?”, see endnote 13.
[21] Ibid. The authors refer to Erin E. Arvedlund: “Follow the money: terrorist conspirators could have profited more from fall of entire market than single stocks“, published in Barron’s on October 8, 2001.
[22] Wong, Thompson, Teh: “Was there Abnormal Trading in the S&P 500 Index Options Prior to the September 11 Attacks?”
[25] Marina Alcaraz: “11 septembre 2001: des volumes inhabituels sur les options peu avant l’attentat”, published in Les Echos, page 34, September 10, 2001, online at:
[26] Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri and Loriano Mancini: “Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the Option Markets”, see endnote 10.
[30] Compare Marc Chesney, Remo Crameri and Loriano Mancini: “Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the Option Markets”, published at the University of Zurich on September 7, 2018 under:bf. uzh. ch/publikationen/pdf/2098.pdf.
[31] Vgl. Lars Schall: “Sapere Aude!“, German Interview with Dr. Daniele Ganser, published at LarsSchall on August 18, 2018 under:
[32] Compare a copy of the letter by the SEC on MaxKeiser under:
[33] Compare related to this agreement Matt Taibbi: “Is the SEC Covering Up Wall Street Crimes?”, published at Rolling Stone on August 17, 2018 under:
[34] Mark H. Gaffney: “Black 9/11: A Walk on the Dark Side”, published at Foreign Policy Journal on March 2, 2018 under:
[35] Compare Peter Dale Scott: “Launching the U. S. Terror War: the CIA, 9/11, Afghanistan, and Central Asia”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10, Issue 12, No 3, March 19, 2018, online at:japanfocus/-Peter_Dale-Scott/3723.
[35] Erik Kirschbaum: “German Firm Probes Last-Minute World Trade Center Transactions“, published at Reuters on December 19, 2001, online at:
[38] Michael C. Ruppert: “Crossing the Rubicon“, page 244.
[39] Ibid., page 423.
[40] Ibid., page 423 – 426.
[41] Commission Memorandum: “FBI Briefing on Trading“, dated August 18, 2003, page 12, online at: media. nara. gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00269.pdf.
[42] Lars Schall: “9/11 Was A Fantastically Profitable Covert Operation”, Interview with Catherine Austin Fitts, published at LarsSchall on September 3, 2018 under:
[43] Ibid. Compare further related to the “cui bono“ topic Catherine Austin Fitts: “9-11 Profiteering: A Framework for Building the ‘Cui Bono?’“, published at GlobalResearch on March 22, 2004 under:globalresearch. ca/articles/FIT403A. html.
[44] Lars Schall: “9/11 Was A Fantastically Profitable Covert Operation”, see endnote 42.
[45] Compare “Bank of America among 38 stocks in SEC’s attack probe”, see endnote 14. “A Raytheon option that makes money if shares are more than $25 each had 232 options contracts traded on the day before the attacks, almost six times the total number of trades that had occurred before that day. A contract represents options on 100 shares. Raytheon shares soared almost 37 percent to $34.04 during the first week of post-attack U. S. trading.”
[46] Compare Barry Grey: “Suspicious trading points to advance knowledge by big investors of September 11 attacks”, published at World Socialist Web Site on October 5, 2001 under:
[47] J. S. Kim: “Inside the Illusory Empire of the Banking Commodity Con Game”, published at The Underground Investor on October 19, 2018 under:
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